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RADICAL PLURAL DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNET
MARGARET CHON
Democratic antagonism refers to resistance to subordination and
inequality; democratic struggle is directed toward a wide democratization
of social life. I am hinting here at the possibility that democratic antago-
nism can be articulated into different kinds of discourse, even into right-
wing discourse, because antagonisms are polysemic. There is no one
paradigmatic form in which resistance against domination is expressed.
Chantal Mouffe
The Internet is often celebrated as a new social space in which significant
social attributes such as sex or race are muted or even non-existent. The
lack of fixed social identities or political/juridical borders is often cited as
evidence of a social freedom that is greater than that existing in "real" space.
Yet, the economy of international dating, sexual, and marriage services on
the Internet, for example, is undeniably linked to existing inequities by sex,
race, and other material markers.2
Facilitated tremendously by networked digital technologies, these
services give lie to the truism that "on the Internet, no one knows you're a
dog." 3 By examining the consequences these particular social practices on
the Internet have in physical space, this Essay attempts to re-pivot the
democratic discourse of the Internet so as to include Chantal Mouffe's vision
of a radical and plural democracy: one that accounts for missing material
markers, one that encourages the proliferation of different democratic
struggles, one that acknowledges that "[a]ll inequities existing in our society
are now at issue.""
This Essay begins by relating a couple of "war stories" from the class-
room. Typically, law professors bring "war stories" of law practice to
rather than from the classroom, in order to demonstrate that they have had
practical legal experience and to boost their credibility with their own
students. By contrast, these war stories are of discursive reformations within
" Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. Thanks to Robert S. Chang, whose
intellectual restlessness has often catalyzed mine, and to Khoa Nguyen, my research assistant.
1. Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of
Democracy, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 96 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence
Grossberg eds., 1988).
2. Isla Godlovitch, How Much is that Girl in the window?, CYBERIA MAGAZINE <http:-
//magazine.eyberiacafe.net/issue-l.l/featureslfeatures2.html> (on file with author); Jeff Liu,
Cyber-order Brides: Mail-order Services Making Their Way onto the Net, AAJA VOICEs, Aug.
17, 1996 <http://www.aaja.org/Voies96/satlbride.html> (on file with author); Liz Hunt,
Brides and Prostitutes Sold on the Internet, THE INDEPENDENT, July 3, 1996 (1996 WL
9936922); Betsy McKay, E-Mail-Order Brides: Russian Ladies Seek Marriage by Modem, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 3, 1996 (1996 WL-WSJE 3339146).
3. This quotation is attributed to a cartoon published in The New Yorker.
4. Mouffe, supra note 1, at 100.
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the classroom, in order to demonstrate how difficult it can be for professors
and students alike to articulate the contested nature of what seem already to
be "given" and "natural" features of the Internet.
Just a year ago, I attempted to teach a seminar class on gender and
cyberspace. I had been teaching the group of eleven men and one woman
for a semester and a half. The class chemistry had been excellent as I
covered topics such as privacy, information access, and copyright on the
Internet. This particular class erupted almost immediately into crisis. One
male student, who happened to be a member of a racial minority group,
insisted that there were always problems between men and women and that
there always will be problems between men and women, so why study this
subject? I calmly replied there have always been problems with territorial
jurisdiction and there always will be problems with territorial jurisdiction, so
why study it? The class was one of the most fractious of my entire teaching
career, and we were all shaken by the raw emotion of it.
Another story unfolded this year. In my Internet Law class, we had
been discussing the federal criminal prosecution of Jake Baker, the Universi-
ty of Michigan student who had sent E-mail messages of sexual fantasies
involving the rape, torture, and murder of young girls over the Internet.5
This time, knowing that my feminist instincts would make me unsympathetic
to Baker, I went out of my way to create space for factual and legal
arguments that would justify the district court's dismissal of the indictment
for making interstate threats. The legal arguments, predictably enough, lay
in the realm of freedom of expression, the factual arguments in the court's
construction of the recipient's reaction to the alleged threats. In the next
class, however, I began asking whether the utopian view of the Internet as
a decentralized communication medium with revolutionary democratic
potential is challenged by the snuff story posted by Baker to an Internet
usenet newsgroup (a story that featured one of his classmates as the object-
victim and triggered but did not form the basis for the federal prosecution).
After a short silence, a female student stated that she had concluded after
the last class discussion that the government should never have brought the
case against Baker. But on her way home from school that same day, her
car had broken down. She had called the Automobile Association of
America (AAA). A few minutes later, a tow truck driver came along, and
said that she needed to go with him to the home office. She had felt that his
request was out of the ordinary, and refused to go with him. As they were
debating with each other, a second tow truck driver came by. The first
driver got very nervous and drove off. It turns out that AAA was posting
directions to cars on the Internet, and that the first truck driver was not
associated with the AAA. He had been monitoring the Internet site and
preying on women whose cars had broken down. At least two rapes were
5. U.S. v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mi. 1995), aff'd, U.S. v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d
1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 33
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allegedly attributable to him. My student stated that after this had happened
to her, she reacted very differently to the question of whether Baker's stories
were harmless. Afterwards, one of my male students, one who could be a
student of color but who eschews any specific racial identity, came to my
office and expressed being perplexed in his reactions to the class. He
dislikes regulation, but his classmate's story had made him rethink the need
for legal norms governing the Internet.
These classroom dynamics reflect Chantal Mouffe's description of the
potential (but not the inevitability) of democratic antagonisms to lead to
democratic struggles, as articulated in the opening epigraph.6 We usually
accurately recognize the impulse toward greater freedom. However,
democratic impulses can be expressed and deployed in various, not necessari-
ly freeing, ways.
One prevailing discourse of the Internet centers and celebrates the
fluidity of social identity. This is a type of resistance to subordination and
inequality-a yearning toward greater autonomy if not power-a type of
democratic antagonism toward the stickiness of actual social relations.
(Indeed, the person to whom Jake Baker addressed his sexual fantasies was
never actually found, and his actual gender, race or class was assumed rather
than known by the federal judge who ruled on whether Baker's E-mail
messages would have been perceived as threatening to the recipient.)
However, this impulse toward freedom may or may not be transformed into
democratic-or what is referred to here as anti-subordination-struggles.
Democratic struggles differ from democratic antagonisms in that the former
represents actual or incipient "new social movements": movements that are
"the extensions of the democratic revolution to new forms of subordina-
tion."7 The seductiveness of the Internet to many (its fluidity, its decentral-
izing tendency, its ability to rupture assumptions we make about others)
appeals to those vibrating around very different points of the ideological
spectrum. For example, the yearning toward freedom can be stitched within
an ideology that glorifies individualist transactions in apparently unregulated
markets-what I call the liber-contractarian approach to legal regulation. My
argument here is directed against this ideological focus by many of the
emerging legal theorists of cyberspace:8 this approach completely ignores the
6. Mouffe, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); David Post, Anarchy and Siate on the Internet: An
Essay on law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3 <http://www.wm.edu-
IlawlpublicationsljoI>; Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers:
Controlling Behavior in Cyberspace through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 JURIMEmRICS J. 1
(1994); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for Cyberspace, 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 993
(1994); but see Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Julie Cohen, A Right to ReadAnony-
moisly: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981
(1996); Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095 (1996); Lawrence
Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996); Margaret Jane Radin,
1997]
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social conditions of vast groups of people in the world whose lives are
affected directly or indirectly by digital network technologies. And that is
partly because these theorists are insufficiently attentive to the difference that
Mouffe articulates between democratic antagonisms and democratic struggles.
Their undue focus on freedom is at the expense of the different democratic
value of equality.
Significantly, Mouffe acknowledges those state interventions either on
behalf of or against the interests of capital, "because of their bureaucratic
character, may produce new forms of subordination."9 New social move-
ments that form the basis of her radical plural democracy may also include
movements that are catalyzed initially by an antagonism against interventions
of state bureaucracy. Mouffe's acknowledgment is important because
perhaps the dominant democratic movements on the Internet so far are
libertarian or even anarchic in nature. Internet libertarians, like other
libertarians, defend the sphere of individual liberty against incursions by the
state. On the "infobahn," this defense of democracy occurs most vividly
with respect to the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Expressive
activities fall into this endangered realm range from speech that educates the
public about prison rape"° to fantasies about raping and killing young
women' to computer code that represents textually the process of encryp-
tion.'2 To the extent that one does not agree with or want exposure to these
types of expressive activities, one's main recourse is to "opt out" of the
discourse. Cyberlibertarians thus depend quite heavily, if implicitly, on the
contractual legal paradigm, in which parties can choose to deal or not to deal
with each other in expression (or information) markets. 3 Many of the
"new" legal paradigms being bandied about for the Internet are in fact
reformulations of familiar liber-contractarian models.
The quite powerful ideology of liber-contractarianism ignores at least
two salient facts, the recognition of which can create what Mouffe calls
"antagonisms." 14 The first fact is that unregulated markets do not exist a
Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J. L. COMM. 509 (1996).
9. Mouffe, supra note 1, at 93.
10. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554
(1996).
11. U.S. v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mi. 1995), f"d, U.S. v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d
1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
12. Bernstein v. U.S., 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
13. Jesse Drew, Who Owns the Internet? An Investigation into the Privatization and
Corporate Control of the National Information Infrastructure, 53 GUILD PRAC. 189, 199-200
(1996) ("The commercial laissez-faire model stresses the concept of 'consumer sovereignty,' a
position put forward by many of today's media industries. . . [, but a]ccording to theorist
Raymond Williams, media conglomerates rely on well known narrative and pleasure devices that
work by incorporation rather than imposition.").
14. Mouffe, supra note 1, at 94 ("An antagonism can emerge when a collective subject-of
course, here I am interested in political antagonism at the level of the collective subject-that has
been constructed in a specific way, to certain existing discourses, finds its subjectivity negated
by other discourses or practices.").
[Vol. 33
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priori of some set of initial rules, so that even a "pristine" market free of
"corrupting" legal rules is constructed by legal (as well as social, economic,
cultural, etc.) default paradigms. Technology itself is a type of social
structure that contributes to the delimitation of legal choices."5 The second,
a corollary of the first, is that some are more free to contract than others,
just as (despite our equality principles) some are still much more equal than
others. That is, even digital networks are not gridded homogeneously with
freedom or equality, but rather, in Keith Aoki's words, are "notable for their
lumpiness, their unevenness. " " Globalization in areas other than digital
technology does not obviate borders; "Instead, religious, familial, hetero-
sexist and racial borders are called forth to renegotiate globalized spaces." 17
Both facts are illustrated by my female student's desire to participate as an
equal player in the proliferation of Internet expression, a desire which is then
sharply problematized for her and her sympathetic classmates by the material
consequences of being a female object of male aggression. These cultural
contradictions thus have the potential to interrupt the liber-contractarian
ideology's preference for freedom over equality.
Sexual, dating, and marriage services over the Internet interrupt the
ideological power of the liber-contractarians with almost embarrassing
bluntness. Even the most casual observers frame their initial reactions in
post-colonial vocabulary. Lesley Stahl on Sixty Minutes recently stated,
The reason [for these services] is not only the irresistible charm of
American men, it's that marriage is an escape route from poverty. Mired
in the Third World, the Philippines relies heavily on exports to the First
World, and one of its most valuable exports is its women. Each year close
to a half a million Filipinas go to foreign countries, . . . And they send
millions of dollars a year back home. There's an unwritten law that
daughters sacrifice for the rest of the family."8
While another observer states bluntly that "only losers" find women this
way, 9 men who seek compliant, less powerful women within a racialized
other are arguably following a simple logic of American masculinity.' Each
of these observations exposes the poverty of the cyberlibertarian assumption
that meaningful choices guide these transactions.
15. RICHARD SCLOVE, DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY 15 (1995).
16. Aoki, supra note 8, at 1305; see generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND
SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); Rosemary
Coombe, Left Out on the Information Highway, 75 OR. L. REv. 237 (Spring 1996).
17. Zillah Eisenstein, Stop Stomping on the Rest of Us: Retrieving Publicness from the
Privatization of the Globe, 4 IND. J. GLOB. L. ST. (1997) <www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol4/nol-
/eispgp.html>.
18. Sixty Minutes: Here Come the Brides (CBS, Inc. television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1997).
19. Basu Rekha, Mail-order brides exploited, THE DES MOINES REGISTER, June 3, 1996
(1996 WL 6241009).
20. I am indebted to Lisa Ikemoto for this observation, made in the context of her research
on personal ads.
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Within this post-colonial technological framework, law operates in
multiple ways. For example, these services can be rationalized quite
respectably within the liber-contractarian construct that dominates Internet
culture. Operators and users of these services claim that the women who
marry this way are making rational choices, given their options. They also
claim that men who marry this way are making a rational choice to marry
someone with more traditional feminine values, albeit outside of their own
cultural "tradition." The contractual exchange or consideration is American
citizenship and economic privilege for the woman; for the man, it is access
to quintessentially feminized domestic and sexual services. This transaction,
like Alfred Hitchcock's movie Vertigo, interrogates rather than affirms the
very idea of romantic love. Instead of the erotic bonding signified by
romance, both parties to the transaction desire greater autonomy from
economic, social, and cultural strictures. In these transactions, the man
wants to retain certain masculinized prerogatives that might be threatened in
domestic culture by the gains of the feminist movement. From a more
sympathetic perspective that considers men to be as trapped in patriarchy as
women, perhaps these men do not want to be forced to assume certain
masculine qualities that signal desirability or eligibility in a purely domestic
marriage market. 21 The women in these transactions want more social and
economic privilege (or perhaps, these women do not want to be forced to
assume certain feminine traits that signals eligibility in the domestic marriage
market of their patriarchal cultures of origin). Thus, the liber-contractarian
vocabulary provides arguments that this transaction is a type of resistance to
subordination and inequality.
Arguments in support of these transactions can even be framed in a way
that makes the man seem to be taken advantage of-he is viewed primarily
for his ability to be a conduit for immigration of his wife's relatives, or for
his ability to be able to send payments back to her home, rather than for his
sex appeal. As the undercover male journalist in the same Sixty Minutes
segment stated on the fifth day of his bride-shopping tour in the Philippines,
"And it seemed like it was a two-way street. The men were there for
something and the women were there for something. One party gets
something, and the other party gets something in return."'" There is a
certain wistfulness about the existence of these transactions at all, even on the
part of their supporters. This may stem from Mouffe's observation that
some democratic antagonism is in part a response to the pervasive commer-
cialization and commodification of all aspects of social life, including
love.' Under this view, the woman's limited expression of agency is at
21. C. Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness,
43 UCLA L. REv. 1037, 1054-1072 (1996) (discussing how gender roles disadvantage men as
well as women).
22. Sixty Minutes, supra note 18.
23. Mouffe, supra note 1, at 92.
[Vol. 33
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odds with the assumption underlying romantic love that money ought not to
matter.24
The liber-contractarian ideology glorifies not only individual choice but
also individual privacy. Thus it also depends in large part on a preexisting
legal framework that firmly separates the realm of private decisionmaking
from public (or governmental) intrusion. Other ideological perspectives
might also locate a privacy interest that attaches to these transactions. For
example, privacy of individuals and/or family relations is a basis for arguing
that women who want to leave these relationships before the two-year
conditional status time frame has passed should not be interrogated by the
INS about the nature of their relationships.' But most critical ideological
perspectives would not automatically assume that individual privacy is largely
divorced from legal rules; rather they would assume that privacy is construct-
ed by legal rules that liber-contractarians supposedly eschew.
Indeed, the obvious power imbalances between the marriage partners
almost demand a standard feminist deconstruction of the public/private
distinction. Under this view, the law's refusal to intervene affirmatively
in private acts of oppression is pathological. What the male journalist does
not analyze in his "freedom of contract" sequence is that the ratio of women
to men in the room is 11:1. How is it that these women, including educated,
middle-class women, feel that it is a rational choice to marry outside of their
culture, often to men whom they barely know? Why would women leave
their homes and families, to live without even the most basic social support
networks, to be utterly dependent on their sponsoring spouse, to fulfill what
might be rigidly and stereotypically feminized or sexualized expectations on
the part of that spouse, or to be forced into sex before marriage?' How
could they consent to be picked out of a digital catalogue, sometimes without
demanding or receiving in return significant information about their
prospective spouse? A sense of adventure surely cannot be the sole
explanation.
Given what many American feminists suspect of the probable power
imbalance in such transactions, an anti-subordination response would be to
prohibit legally these acts. What kind of man marries like this? A perpetra-
tor-and the law should reflect that. What kind of woman is involved in
24. C. Gary Clark, Things to be Careful About in Looking for a Foreign Wife (1995)
<http://wvw.upbeat.comlwtwpubslCaveats.htm> (on file with author); Greg Myre, U.S.
Bachelors Take their Hopes, Dreams to Russia, THE SEhTrLE TIMES, April 27, 1997, at A18;
qJohn Winzenburg, The Geopolitics of Desire: What's the real cost offree sex in Asia?, UTNE
ONLINE <wvmw.utne.com/lens/es/20csfreesex.html > (on file with author).
25. Eddie Meng, Mail-Order Brides: Gilded Prostitution and the Legal Response, 28 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 197, 235-37 (1994); Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The
Legacy of Coverture, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 385 (Adrien K. Wing ed., 1996).
26. Susan H. Williams, Globalization, Privatization and a Feminist Public, 4 IND. J. GLOB.
L. ST. (1997) (www.law.indiana.edulglsj/vol4/nol/wilpgp.html).
27. Meng, supra note 25, at 209; cf. Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized
Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets Suzy Wong, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM:
A READER 203, 204-05 (Adrien K. Wing ed., 1996).
19971
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these transactions? A victim-and the law should reflect that. A feminist
legal critique would then focus on the lack of intervention of the law in these
"private" practices of subordination. Indeed, proposals have been made for
additional legal regulation, for example through international law categories
that articulate these practices as analogous to slavery or other human rights
violations.' Here, the yearning for autonomy or freedom then turns into
what might be termed anti-subordination struggle. The exercise of male
prerogative, while an expression of a desire for freedom, is not part of this
democratic struggle, for instead of striving to reduce all inequalities, it tends
to "widen an already deep social split between the privileged and non-
privileged. "29
Yet feminist critiques are not the only possible anti-subordination
responses. A racial critique of these practices, while overlapping with the
feminist critique in its focus on the equity imbalance, might focus on a
different set of concerns. Instead of a primary focus on "private" acts of
oppression of men against women, the subordination of concern is of White
over non-White. Framed in this way, a racial critique of the law might begin
with United States immigration and naturalization laws, which have long
operated to inscribe in a very public manner a racialized foreignness upon
Asian women, and which currently, through the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1988 (IMFA), continues that legally imposed racialization.
Thus, the problem with the law is not its apparent lack of intervention in the
market or its structuring of the realm of the private, but rather its meta-
presence:
the requirements for converting from conditional to permanent resident
status indicate that consummation of marriage, having children, using birth
control, or performing domestic services (evidence of doing housework)
can be sufficient to show a viable marriage. But these standards actually
prescribe what immigrant women must do to fulfill their two-year
warranty: offer sexual services... offer domestic labor .... or void the
warranty by being abused. In other words, the viability standard used by
the INS not only create obstacles for mail-order brides to leave their
consumer-husbands, but also tells them that they may be deported unless
they give their consumer-husbands their money's worth.30
From this perspective, the law polices the boundaries of race by making
the non-White woman even more vulnerable to the racialized expectations of
their spouses. They are required by law to be even more compliant, more
feminized, and ultimately more expendable than a White partner from the
domestic marriage market might be.
28. See Norma V. Demleitner, Forced Prostitution: Naming an International Offense, 18
FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 163 (1994).
29. Mouffe, supra note 1, at 100.
30. Meng, supra note 25, at 224-25.
[Vol. 33
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The feminist and racial perspectives of law can be mined for further
insights, but the main goal here is to try (if possible) to move toward
constructing an equivalence between the liber-contractarian approach to
freedom (a dominant type of democratic antagonism in the nineties) and these
other critical approaches (democratic or anti-subordination struggles). What
do we make of the concept of "choice" that infuses the liber-contractarian
model, which has such a powerful hold on our collective imagination, and
yet that is challenged so clearly by the undeniable power differentials
operating within international Internet marriage markets? Is it possible to
link the principle of freedom in the expressive domain to the other democrat-
ic project of extending the equality principle to all possible forms of social
relations? Or are these different "freedom" projects incommensurable?
Not all choosers are equal, illustrated simplistically by the fact that not
all choosers are citizens of the same political states. The transition from one
political zone to another through these brokering services is a border-crossing
that produces a crisis in meaning about the supposedly borderless environ-
ment created by the Internet. (My own sense is that such border-crossings
would become more of a crisis if they typically involved White American
women being forced by economic circumstances to marry non-White non-
American men.) Freedom of choice only makes sense if the context for
exercising choice is relatively the same for the choosing players, or if there
is commensurability among different contexts. Both Keith Aoki and
Rosemary Coombe have explored how actual if invisible borders constrain
some peoples' democratic choices vis-a-vis others'.3 The Internet slogans
of identity-shifting and borderlessness only obscure the identity-defined and
border-constrained choices that take place (just as racial ideology of color
blindness can obscure the race-defined choices that take place). Thus the
rhetoric of borderlessness disables us from examining the stages at which
meaningful choice may become possible.
This leads us to another point about choice: Is there a point at which
meaningful choice does become possible? Perhaps citizenship-a key term of
art in democratic discourse-is an imperfect proxy for a kind of equality of
bargaining power that makes us more comfortable with freedom of contract.
As Mouffe declares, "[d]emocratic discourse extends -its field of influence
from a starting point, the equality of citizens in a political democracy, to
socialism, which extends equality to the level of the economy and then into
other social relations, such as sexual, racial, generational, and regional." 32
The crisis provoked by the international marriage markets is precisely that
"citizenship" is not the starting point, and thus democratic discourse begins
31. See generally Aoki, supra note 8; Rosemary Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things:
Anthropological Approaches to Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. U. I.
INT'L. L & POL'Y 791, 798 (1995); see also Eisenstein, supra note 17.
32. Mouffe, supra note 1, at 96.
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at a point that is so far from our national community that little equality can
be presumed.33
If there is an extension of the concept of "choice" to players outside
national or cultural borders, but within the "borders" of the Internet, then
how would it be deployed? Perhaps extraterritorial expansion of contractual
first principles will lead eventually to greater demands for equality within
those other communities: an exporting of American democratic freedoms.
But of course, that is an extreme universalist and optimistic view. Freedom
of contract makes no sense in local communities in which there is literally
no economic choice but to marry up and out. "People struggle for equality
not because of some ontological postulate but because they have been
constructed as subjects in a democratic tradition that puts those values at the
center of social life."' Within the U.S., "the location of Asian women's
work-at the intersection of processes of immigration, racialization, labor
exploitation, and patriarchal gender relations-marks that work as irreducible
to the concept of 'abstract labor,' and distinguishes the subjectivity it
constitutes as unassimilable to an abstract political identity . .. ,,"I In these
women's countries of origin, moral and political values (not to mention
social, cultural and religious contexts) are constructed very differently from
western liberal political frameworks, so that, for example, individual
autonomy may be less meaningful than familial security as a first princi-
ple.36 Moreover, if women in the Philippines or other Asian countries are
focussed on "bread" issues, chances are quite good that they and the people
around them are not putting their need for autonomy or equality at the top
of their priority lists. The desperation of these women is attributable to
colonialist and neo-colonialist structures that systematically overfeed the
developed nations at the expense of the lesser developed. Yet, in our
critique of their "choice," we ought not to deny the agericy (however limited)
that these women may have and exercise, even in the face of daunting
structural inequities. What post-colonial theory can add to colonialism
theories, according to Eric Yamamoto, is "a limited or constrained form of
agency [in which t]he subordinated can 'speak' for themselves, and thereby
at least partially define themselves in relation to dominant powers and other
33. Of course, the boundaries of and privileges accruing to citizenship are contested, but
that debate is too complex to address here.
34. Mouffe, supra note 1, at 95.
35. Lisa Lowe, Work, Immigration, Gender:Asian "American' Women in IMMIGRANTACTS:
ON ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLIICS 158 (1996).
36. Saskia Sassen, Toward a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy, 4 IND. J. GLOB.
L. ST. (1997) <www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol4 nol/saspgp.html>; Gracia Clark, Implications
of Global Polarization for Feminist Work, 4 IND. J. GLOB. L. ST. (1997) (www.law.indiana.-
edu/glsj/vol4/nol/clapgp.html); Eisenstein, supra note 17; Williams, supra note 26.
[Vol. 33
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groups, even if only in fractured ways." 3" A post-colonial gloss on
"choice" would be to recognize that shutting these markets down completely
may be a paternalistic and imperialistic response to the problem, not to
mention an improbable one given how much cultural leeway we give to the
private realm of choice of a marriage partner.
What might emerge as a possible link in the chain of democratic
equivalences here? Zones of choice could be defined more explicitly by law.
Rather than treating the Internet as borderless and ergo lawless, lawmakers
(whether through state intervention, multistate agreements, or the creation of
private civil remedies) could begin to construct boundaries that encompass
"free choice" zones-ones that redress, albeit imperfectly, the lack of
equality of bargaining power between the parties. The goal would be to
equalize the playing field so that women entering the U.S. can claim
simultaneously freedom and equality. Legal rules that constrain choice are
not per se anti-democratic, and in some cases are necessary in order to
extend equality to people other than economically privileged first world
White males. "Choice" might be meaningful for women of the third world
under certain circumstances. Indeed, in some cultures, brokered marriages
are still common especially among the educated, middle-class.3"
I will end as I have started: with a "war story." A few years ago, I was
confronted by a young man who had a computer science undergraduate
degree from Princeton, and who was taking my Computers and the Law class
because he was convinced that the Robert Morris conviction had been a great
injustice. Morris was the hacker at Cornell University who had introduced
a "worm" into the Internet, purportedly to demonstrate the insecure nature
of defense department computer networks, and resulting in massive
shutdowns of Internet-linked computers. He was convicted under a federal
statute prohibiting unauthorized access to federal government computers. 9
I responded to this student's sense of injustice with surprise, because at that
point in my thinking about the Internet, I had not yet deconstructed the "bad
37. Eric Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice,
3 UCLA AsIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33, 58 (1995); cf. Satoko Watenabe, Women's Struggles and
Female Migration Into Japan in the 1980s-1990s, dissertation proposal <http://www.eco.ute-
xas.edu/Homepageslfaculty/Cleaver/satprop.html>. ("The overall objective of this dissertation
is to investigate the degree to which those female immigrant workers are not merely passive
victims of unequal development but are autonomous subjects who use international mobility to
improve their lives . . ").
38. See, e.g., Sheryl WuDunn, Journal: In Korea, Dating Services Take Over from
Arranged Marriages, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 1997; see also <http://www.ozemail.com.au-
/-indoaust/> (website for Indians living overseas in Australia that accepts matrimonial ads).
In these, the expectations of the parties are not shaped by extreme economic differentials or
racialized notions of the "other"-although they might be characterized by specific and perhaps
patriarchal gender expectations. These cultural practices are not abnormal or dysfunctional,
except perhaps by reference to other cultures' norms. Some of these traditional brokering
services are taking place over the Internet, and might provide a comparative frame of reference
for drafting legal rules defining the boundaries of these transactions.
39. U.S. v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming conviction under 18 U.S.C.§ 1030(a)(5)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 817 (1991).
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boy" image of the computer hacker. It had not yet occurred to me that
hackers had been culturally constructed as "deviants" in an unjust and unfair
way.' One interesting thing about this exchange is that my student was in
every other way apparently quite conservative, down to his closely cropped
hair, and my identity is very much grounded in being part of the countercul-
ture.
His sense of injustice about Morris was as profound as my sense of
injustice about other Asian women who do not have the choices I have. The
project of constructing a chain of democratic equivalences-of constructing
solidarity-between his sense of injustice and mine forms one strand of
Mouffe's radical plural democracy.
40. Andrew Ross, Hacking Away at Counterculture, in TECHNOCULTURE 107 (Constance
Penley and Andrew Ross eds., 1991).
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